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WHO IS JESSICA'S MOTHER? DEFINING
MOTHERHOOD THROUGH REALITY
SUELLYN SCARNECCHIA*
The recent Baby Jessica case and others like it have renewed the nature
versus nurture debate in family law. Baby Jessica's biological parents, the
Schmidts, sought to obtain permanent custody of their daughter after giving her
up for adoption to the DeBoer family. Their argument was one that found its
basis in biology and the idea of a traditional family.
On the other hand, with the assistance of Professor Scarnecchia, the DeBoers
argued that it was more important forJessica's overall health to remain with
her primary caretakers of two years. Courts, however, have taken a more
traditional view of this complex situation. Historically, there has been great
resistance to the argument that the best interests of the child should rule over
a biological relationship. As a result, the Schmidts won custody of Baby
Jessica.
In the following speech, Professor Scarnecchia articulates the limitations of
a biological approach to child custody cases. She argues for a children's rights-
based decision making process in family law.
Professor Scarnecchia presented this speech at The American University
Journal of Gender & the Law symposium "Gender, Family and Change:
Developments in the Legal Regulation of Family Life" on April 9, 1994.
In the BabyJessica case, I represented Jan and Robby DeBoer, the
couple who took custody of Jessica when she was a few weeks old and
parented her until August 2, 1993, when she was two and a half years
old.1 They were Jessi's Mom and Dad every day of her life for those
* Clinical Professor of Law, Child Advocacy Law Clinic, University of Michigan Law
School. B.A., Northwestern University. J.D., University of Michigan Law School. President,
Women Lawyer's Association of Michigan (1993).
1. DeBoerv. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich.), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer
114 S. Ct. 1 (1993) (stating that the DeBoers were given custody ofJessica on February 25, 1991,
when the parental rights of Cara Clausen were terminated).
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two and a half years, then she moved to Iowa and they will probably
not see her again until she is grown and visits them.
There are two moments in my representation of Jan and Robby
that I want to share with you, and then I will talk with you about what
I have learned about defining motherhood through participating in
this very difficult and sad case.
The first incident occurred in the office of Robby and Jan's
therapist. My clients and I were meeting with their personal therapist
and with a child therapist who had previously evaluated Jessica and
gave us advice about how to handle the transfer ofJessi from one set
of parents to the other. By the time of this meeting, we had already
lost in the Michigan Supreme CourtF and we knew that Jessi would
leave Jan and Robby on August 2, unless the United States Supreme
Court granted a stay.
Robby spent the majority of her hours during the prior two years
with Jessica: feeding her, dressing her, holding her, and loving her.
During the meeting, Robby turned to me, clearly frustrated by my
contributions to the meeting, and said, "I don't know if you really
believe that I amJessica's mother. Do you really believe that I am her
mother? If this was your son, what would you do?" I could not
answer her. Finally, I said something like, "I'm not in your situation.
I don't know what I would do." I felt very cornered and challenged.
I remember trying to define my professional role to explain why my
answer to Robby's question was not important. It was not until the
second incident that I knew the true answer to Robby's question.
The second incident happened a few weeks after I carriedJessi out
of Robby's house and delivered her to Dan and Cara Schmidt.
Robby came over to my house to talk about some decisions that were
still pending. We sat down in my dining room and I went to pull
some Diet Cokes out of the refrigerator. Robby started to talk again
about being Jessi's real mother. Suddenly, it all came together for
me. I told her that as a lawyer I never truly believed that she was
Jessi's mother. I had been extremely well trained to remain objective,
and I believed that I could not argue the case if I did not remain
objective. I had to remain convinced that Cara Schmidt had an
arguable legal basis for claiming that she was Jessi's mother, or I
would not be able to see the legal arguments on the other side of the
case. I had to be a lawyer. In being a lawyer, I forced my mind to
suspend judgment about who was Jessi's mother. After all, that is
2. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 667 (ordering the transfer of custody to the birth parents, Dan
and Cam Schmidt).
[Vol. 3:1
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what we were arguing about in the case. No one knew; the courts
would have to decide.
I started crying then, in the archway between my dining room and
kitchen, when I told Robby that I never really believed that she was
Jessica's mother until I saw her walk into my house alone that day,
withoutJessi. Then, all of what I knew as a person, not as a lawyer,
came flooding back. There was nothing but a mother-daughter
relationship between Robby andJessi. When Robby lostJessi, she lost
her daughter. When Jessi lost Robby, she lost her mother. I realized
that one part of my brain was functioning as a lawyer, trying to
suspend judgment and repress what I knew as a person. The other
part of my brain, the woman-in-me, the mother-in-me, had personally
witnessed the bonding, love, attachment, and connection between
Robby and Jessi. Part of me knew that Robby was Jessi's mother, but
part of me also denied that she was her mother.
When I speak about this case, I often say that mental health
professionals think those of us in the legal profession are nuts. How
could we imagine separating a child from the people whom she loves
as her parents? When I would try to explain to child therapists the
legal reasons why the transfer of custody might happen, they gave me
a quizzical, you-must-be-crazy, kind of look. I imagined they were
thinking: "Is this really you speaking, Suellyn? You seem like such a
warm, intelligent woman. How can you speak of ripping this family
apart in such a cool and rational way?"
It is even worse when I try to explain the case to other mothers;
mothers who are not lawyers or therapists, but women with their own
children, who know plainly and clearly what makes a mother and what
it would mean for a two year old to lose hers. These women look at
me with complete disbelief. How is it that the law does not recognize
that Robby isJessi's mother and that to take her away would hurt both
of them?
I confess to this apparent ability of mine to repress reality while I
am practicing law for a few reasons. First, it mirrors the ability of
lawmakers and judges to repress reality when they are making and
applying law. Second, it suggests a need to apply the feminist method
of looking at the real stories behind people's lives to the question of
defining family relationships.3 For instance, have we ever forced
3. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 599, 601
(1989) (explaining that "modern feminist legal theory seeks ... to establish a distinct...
jurisprudence by developing insights and theoretical criticism from perspectives shaped by the
lived-experiences of women whose interest feminist theory seeks to affirm") (citing Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, MarxisM, Method, and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635,
Fall 1994]
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ourselves to look at the reality of children's lives? What would
Jessica's or Robby's narrative look like? Third, it challenges us to
create remedies for child custody cases which will recognize the reality
of children's lives.4
How is it that the law could completely ignore Jessica's loss of the
only parents she ever knew and the impact that loss had on her? The
law in question in this case is law that treats the biological link
between parent and child as sacred. In my particular case, the Iowa
courts interpreted the Iowa Adoption Act to require that the custody
be given to the biological father since he never consented to the
adoption.' Dan Schmidt owned her by reason of his biological link,
even though he was not married to the biological mother, even
though he worked at the same place as the mother during the
pregnancy and never asked her if the baby was his, and even though
the mother named another man as the father at birth.6 Jessica now
lives with Dan because the courts held that he had an absolute right
to her custody unless he was unfit." His failure to adequately parent
his two older children in the past was deemed irrelevant.' To Jessica,
Dan Schmidt was a stranger.
At the time Robby and Jan took custody of Jessi, her biological
mother, Cara, was engaged to someone other than Dan Schmidt.9
She later told Dan about Jessi's birth and placement for adoption.
When Jessi was fourteen months old, Cara married Dan Schmidt."0
643 (1983)).
4. See generally James G. O'Keefe, Note, The Need to Consider Children's Rights in Biological
Parent v. Third Party Custody Disputes, 67 CHI. KENT. L. Rv. 1077, 1081 (1991) (suggesting that
the child's welfare is best served by taking into consideration the child's "psychological and
emotional" attachment to the person the child perceives to be his or her parent.); see also
Gregory S. Hilderbran, Parents, Children, and the Courts: Balancing Three CompetingInterests in Third
Party Adoptions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1988) (arguing that both parental relationships
should be treated equally and that the focus in establishing a remedy should be on the child's
needs and interests).
5. See In reB.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 244 (Iowa 1992) (citing The Iowa Adoption Act, IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (West 1991)) (rejecting the DeBoer's argument that there does not have
to be a specific reason for the termination of parental rights and interpreting the Iowa Code to
require a specific basis for the termination of those rights).
6. In reB.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 247.
7. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 665 (holding that absent a showing of parental unfitness, the
birth parent has a right to custody of the minor child regardless of the preference or best
interest of the child).
8. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245 (holding that there was not enough evidence to estab-
lish that Dan Schmidt abandoned Jessica). But see id. at 246 (Snell, J., dissenting) (noting that
Dan Schmidt "in every meaningful way... abandoned" his children by failing to emotionally
or financially support them).
9. SeeMichele Ingrassia and Karen Springen, She's Not BabyJessica Anymore, NEWSEEK, Mar.
21, 1994, at 63 (stating that Cara Clausen was engaged to a truck driver named Scott Seefeldt
at the time of her pregnancy); DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 652 (noting that Cam Clausen had named
Scott Seefeldt as the father of the child).
10. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 562.
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When Jessi was two years old, the Iowa courts reinstated Cara's
parental rights to Jessi because Cam married Dan and because Dan
was granted legal custody." The woman who gave birth to Jessica,
and then lost her rights to Jessica by placing her for adoption, was
once again Jessica's legal mother. To Jessica, Cam Schmidt was a
stranger.
Even though they were strangers to Jessica, the law made Dan and
Cam Schmidt her parents.12 The courts moved Jessica from one
home to the other, explicitly finding that any harm to the child
caused by the change of custody was irrelevant."3 The trial judge in
Michigan, who found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in
Jessi's best interest to stay with Robby and Jan, was soundly re-
versed.1 4
The appellate courts held that the judge should not have considered
the child's interests; it was legal error to consider the reality of
Jessica's life."
The law, in deciding that the Schmidts had an absolute right to
custody of Jessi, further distorted reality by permitting the Schmidts
to pretend that the first two years of Jessi's life did not happen. 6
The law provided no middle ground, no way to order ongoing contact
between Jan and Robby and JessiY' Robby was Jessi's mother on
August 2 until two p.m., and then Cam was her mother. Our ability
as lawyers to design legal fictions fuels the desire of the biological
parents to erase the child's years with the other parents. The
Michigan Supreme Court, for instance, held that because the DeBoers
filed their Michigan case a few hours after the Iowa Court had
terminated their legal guardianship of Jessi, Robby and Jan had no
11. In reB.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
12. DeBoe, 502 N.W.2d at 667.
13. Id. at 666 (finding that a biological parent has a right to custody despite acknowledge-
ment of the "long-established rule that the best interest of the child is of paramount
importance"); see also In Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245 (holding that the courts cannot
deny biological parents custody simply for the welfare of the child where the biological parents
did not consent to the adoption).
14. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 667.
15. See DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Mich. CLt. App. 1993) (rejecting the
argument that the Michigan court could change the Iowa court's ruling based on a best interests
of the child analysis).
16. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 666 (citing Herstman v. Shiftan, 108 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. 1961))
(stating that parents have a "natural right" to their children and that this right should be given
"great consideration" and should not be taken away without a showing of "extremely good
cause").
17. Compare O'Keefe, supra note 4 (suggesting that it is in the best interest of the child to
maintain contact with both parents).
Fall 1994]
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standing to claim custody ofJessi in Michigan.' Within a few hours,
Robby and Jan had been stripped of all legal claim to parenthood,
even though, in reality, they continued to function asJessi's parents.
Because the law permits this bright line - one day I am a mother,
the next day I'm not - the Schmidts were free to impose their own
rendition of reality onJessica. The best example of this was changing
her name. The Schmidts felt thatJessi should have been theirs since
birth. They, as legal parents, therefore, had the right to name her:
to put their seal of ownership on her. They clearly had every
intention of calling her Anna and revealed this to the press prior to
the trial in Michigan.1" When they heard at trial that the experts in
child psychology were saying that it would be terrible forJessi to lose
another part of her identity, they testified that they would not change
her name. But, after one of their visits with Jessi before the transfer,
Cam Schmidt left some of her notes at Robby's house. At the top of
the page, were the words: "Things to do for Anna." Robby was
heartbroken; they had every intention of changing her name. By
December, four months after her move to Iowa, the media reported
that the name change was complete. 0
Although a name is only a word, it holds great significance for us.
In Patty Duke's autobiography, ironically titled Call Me Anna, Duke
described her feelings after her new caretakers, the Rosses, gave her
a new name:
2 1
[W]hen the Rosses said, 'Anna Marie's dead, you're Patty now,'
it was as if she really did die. When people take away your name,
they are taking away your identity. That may seem like a lot of fuss
over a bunch of letters strung together, but your name is an
important symbol. What has happened to that Anna Marie person,
I wanted to know. Could she be dead? Where'd she go?... I felt
as if they'd killed part of me, and in truth they had.22
The law created a family forJessica at birth. The law told Jan and
Robby to take this new baby to another state and to love her as their
own. The courts left her in the legal custody of Jan and Robby for
18. See DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 661 (upholding the Michigan Court of Appeals' ruling that
the DeBoer's lacked standing since their parental rights were terminated when Dan Schmidt was
granted custody). The court also cautioned that another court's ruling in a child custody case
should not be modified where that court exercised jurisdiction properly. Id. at 655 n.21 (citing
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1988)).
19. Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 44, 50.
20. See BabyJessica, PEOPLE, Dec. 27, 1993, at 69 (reporting that BabyJessica was now named
Anna Lee Schmidt).
21. PATNY DUKE AND KENNETH TURAN, CALL ME ANNA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF PATIY DUKE
28 (Bantam 1987).
22. Id.
[Vol. 3:1
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two years after the Schmidts first contested the adoption. Then the
law, through the courts, said to Jessica, "Sorry, our mistake, you
belong to a different family. Go back to Iowa."23 They might as well
have said, "Do not pass go. Do not collect $200." The courts
considered the rules of the game, without reference to how the rules
affected Jessica's life. The court was able to repress reality and
enforce the rules of the game. They declared a new mother for
Jessica, ignoring the reality of her life - a reality that already
included a different mother. In the name of protecting a biological
family which didn't even exist at the time of the child's birth, the
courts destroyed Robby, Jan and Jessica's true and loving family.
I want to turn to the ways in which the law fails to reflect the lives
of non-biological parents. I used to say that I was representing the
invisible clients, Robby and Jan DeBoer. This may sound odd to you,
since Robby and Jan appeared often on television and in print, and
regularly had the opportunity to express their concern overJessica's
fate and to express their own fears and pain.24 The media gave
Robby and Jan a strong public voice. But it was a different story in
the halls of justice. Under the law, the DeBoers were invisible.
How would it affect Jan and Robby to lose their case? Listen to
some of the predictions made in December of 1992 by a psychologist
who specializes in treating parents dealing with grief:
[T]he DeBoers will experience the loss of [Jessica] much like
parents experience the death of a child, in that they will experience
the total loss of a child whom they have come to love and have
cared for as their own. As an infertile couple, seeking to parent,
they were primed to attach to their adopted daughter as if she was
their own biological child, so that they will suffer the same psycho-
23. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239; DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 655-57 (deciding that as a result of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, adopted by Michigan as MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.651, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.651 (Callaghan Supp. 1994), and the Parental Prevention
Kidnapping Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the Michigan courts must enforce the decisions of the
original state, Iowa, and can only modify the decision if the original state no longer has
jurisdiction).
24. See, e.g., Geoffrey Cowley and Karen Springen, Learning to Live WithoutJes, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 21, 1994, at 63 (describing rallies of support for the DeBoers); John Taylor, Biological
Imperative; Child Custody Case over Babyjessi; The National Interest N.Y. MAGAZINE, Aug. 16, 1993,
at 12 (reporting the nation's overwhelming sympathy for the DeBoer's and its outrage at the
court's decision to give Baby Jessi to the Schmidt family); see also Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best
Interest, TIME,July 19,1993, at 44 (providing an overview of the BabyJessica incident); Kathleen
Parker, Baby Jessica Ruling Lacks Common Sense, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 22, 1993, at 1
(supporting the DeBoer family); cf., Mona Charen, Media Adopts Revisionist History in BabyJessica
Case, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 24, 1994, at 45A (criticizing the media for supporting the
Schmidts after the trial); but see Gail Pennington, Baby Jessica Stoiy is Gospel According to DeBoers,
ST. Louis PoSr-DIsPATcH, Sept. 26, 1993, at 6C (offering a disapproving critique of a television
drama based on BabyJessi because it was biased towards the DeBoers).
Fall 1994]
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logical loss as would biological parents who had raised a child for
two years and suddenly lost her. Such a death is viewed as among
the most devastating losses and catastrophic events... I expect the
DeBoers to suffer the following harms:
a. Severe depression ... b. Rage ... due to their perceived
unfairness of a system that allowed them to bond to a child and
then took her away... c. Total helplessness - Unlike [sic] birth
parents who choose to relinquish a child for adoption to a
perceived better situation, the DeBoers would be compelled to
return Uessica] to parents who did not choose to parent her
initially (in the birth mother's case) or has [sic] a poor parenting
record (in the birth father's case). They believe (Jessica] will suffer
psychological trauma and lasting harm due to the transfer of
custody and they will be helpless to assist her ... d. As the child's
psychological parents, the DeBoers will suffer knowing the child is
suffering. In this sense, this loss is actually much worse than the
death of a child when a bereaved parent can at least find some
solace in the child no longer suffering. It is more like the grief
following kidnapped or missing children, extending without end
... e. Loss of self esteem - complete destruction of their image of
themselves as good parents.'
Robby and Jan had strong familial ties with a child. The loss of that
child would devastate them. They had no legal right to protect that
relationship. We have a long, often-repeated history of protecting the
rights of adults to protect their biological relationships with chil-
dren." In the one case in which the Supreme Court might have
recognized the same right to protect one's family for children and
non-biological parents, the Court decided not to decide. Unfortu-
nately, even though the Justices withheld judgment on the question
of whether persons other than biological parents have the right to
protect their families, the Justices made comments on these potential
rights. The dicta of the case called Smith v. Offer27 is cited regularly.
25. Affidavit of Irving G. Leon, Ph.D., at 3-5 (on file with The American University Journal of
Gender & the Law).
26. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy also
protects a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (noting that procreation is a fundamental right); In reJ.C.P., 307 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. 1983)
(holding that the standard to end a parent-child relationship must be clear and convincing
evidence under compelling circumstances); Roche v. Roche, 152 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1944) (deciding
that parenthood is a natural right); Bond v. Norwood, 24 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. 1943) (stating
that the child's best interests lie with the natural father). See also Steven A. v. Rickie M., 823
P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992) (deciding that a biological father may withhold his consent for the
adoption of his child who is born out of wedlock); Durr v. Blue, 454 So. 2d 315 (La. Ct. App.
1984) (affirming a lower court order which ruled that the biological father of three children
could have custody, rendering the adoption proceedings null and void).
27. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
[Vol. 3:1
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One quotation from the case recognizes the strong bond which could
exist without a blood relationship, noting that our protection of
marriage is not based on biological ties, and stating that at some point
these non-biological family members may have a constitutional right
to protect their relationship." On the other hand, the Court
provided a quotation which says that non-biological parents pitted
against biological parents will nearly always lose.29 So, we lawyers
argue about what the Smith case actually said about the rights of
psychological parents. The truth is, the Supreme Court has never
decided whether a child or her non-biological parents have a
constitutional right to protect their loving relationship with each
other.3" We decided not to pursue our case in the United States
Supreme Court after Jessi was transferred to Iowa. We did not want
to transferJessi again after she settled with the Schmidts, and we were
concerned that legally our case had too many complications. Because
of the interstate battle between Michigan and Iowa, the question of
the constitutional rights of Jessi and Robby and Jan would not be
central to a United States Supreme Court case. 1
There are two similar cases pending in the supreme courts of
Illinois and New Mexico: the Baby Richard case in Illinois32 and the
Roth case in New Mexico. 3 Hopefully, the supreme courts of those
states will recognize the humanity of the children involved and allow
them to stay with the only parents they have ever known. If not,
those cases may be ripe for review by the United States Supreme
Court.3 14 I believe we should be cautious about asking the current
Supreme Court to recognize fundamental interests in non-biological
families. The Justice most likely to recognize such an interest, Justice
Blackmun, is retiring from the Bench,35 and there is certainly no
28. Id. at 843.
29. Id. at 847.
30. See Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody is
Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705, 706 (1986).
31. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d 649 (discussing the interstate battle between Iowa and Michigan's
jurisdiction as it pertains to child custody laws throughout the bulk of the opinion).
32. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), petition for leave to appeal allowed, Dec. 1,
1993 (stating that a child's best interests are paramount in a case where the court ruled that the
biological father was unfit and custody was given to the adoptive parents).
33. Roth v. Bookert, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M.
1994) (holding that the biological father could stop adoption proceedings because he had not
abandoned his child and, therefore, was not found an unfit parent by the court).
34. The Baby Richard adoption has been reversed since the time of Professor Scarnecchia's
speech and the attorneys for Richard have filed for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill.2d 347, No. 76063 1994 WL 265086 (Ill.Jun. 16, 1994), reh'g
denied, (July 12, 1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3109 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1994) (No. 94-236).
35. Justice Blackmun announced his retirement on April 6, 1994. Ruth Marcus, Justice
Blackmun Announces Retirement Succession Talk Focuses Largely on Sen. Mitchell, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7,
Fall 1994]
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strong force existing on the Court to recognize any "new" constitu-
tional rights.3"
The inability of the law to recognize Robby and Jan as Jessi's
parents may not reflect the reality of their lives, but it does reflect our
society's strong prejudice against non-biological parents. In Elizabeth
Bartholet's chapter entitled "Adoption and Stigma" in her book Family
Bonds, she writes:
The stigma surrounding adoption is so pervasive that most people
are unaware of its existence; it is part of the air we breathe, part
of the atmosphere of our daily existence. But with adoptive
parenthood comes a new consciousness, and as time passes you feel
successive jars of recognition. You see and hear and feel the stigma
because you and your family have become the alien outsiders - the
object of the stigma."
Professor Bartholet goes on to remind us of the stories of our
childhood, fairy tales in which the non-biological parent is always the
cruel and frightening adult who can not be trusted. She describes the
many disturbing and insensitive comments strangers and friends make
about her two adopted sons."8
I am not an adoptive parent, but having invested much heart and
soul in Jessica's case, I find that I too have suddenly gained the
consciousness Professor Bartholet describes. Now that I am aware of
the stigma, I hear it everywhere.
Here's an example: I was eating lunch with Robby DeBoer and
George Russ after a children's rights rally in Michigan. George is the
adoptive father of Gregory K., the boy who became famous for
divorcing his mother in Florida so that he could have a permanent
adoptive home. 9 George is also a lawyer and he represented
Kimberly Mays in her case in Florida when she attempted to terminate
her biological parents' rights.4" If anyone is sensitive to recognizing
1994, at Al.
36. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993) (Blackmun,J. dissenting from a denial to stay
the BabyJessi decision).
37. ELIzABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS 165 (1993).
38. Id. at 165 n.2 (discussing the common thread in Western folk tales such as, Rapunzel,
Hanzel and Gretel, Snow White, and Cinderella, that unreasonably casts non-blood related child
caretakers as evil beings). Id. at 166 (referring to the story of Moses, who is raised in the house
of the Pharaoh, and later returns to free the Jews from Egypt). Id. at 167 (relating examples
of how her own children are stigmatized by statements such as, "Are they brothers?" and "How
does your own child feel about them?").
39. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), petition for review denied,
1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 164 (Fla. 1994) (terminating a biological mother's parental rights upon
the request of her son, who wished to be adopted by his foster parents).
40. SeeTwiggv. Mays, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989), rev'd, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993WL
330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (examining the case of Kimberly Mays who was switched at
birth and asked the court to terminate the rights of her birth parents).
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that an adoptive family is a real family, it's George. So Robby, George
and I are eating lunch and George is telling us about a lawyer in
Florida who has several children. I can't remember the exact
numbers, but George said something like this: "Yes, he has ten kids,
four are adopted and six are the Real McCoy." I quickly ducked into
my salad, wondering if this unfortunate slip would go unnoticed. Of
course not. Robby turned to George and said: "Now George, you
know they're all the Real McCoy." George's face turned red, and we
all laughed and teased him. I like this story because it illustrates how
ingrained it is in our collective consciousness to carefully differentiate
birth children from adopted children.
So, we should not be too terribly surprised that our law still fails to
recognize Jan and Robby as parents with valid claims when we, as a
society, have not yet come to terms with our bias against nonbiologi-
cal families.
As a clinical law professor, I can't leave you with only these
reflections. I am compelled to add what I think these thoughts mean
to the law and to the practice of law. State law must be reformed,
where necessary, to guarantee three things. First, that children's cases
are decided quickly - we may need a triage system which would
prioritize children's cases, on a case-by-case basis, to determine their
relative need for expedited process. Second, that once a child's fate
lies in the hands of a court, once her custody cannot be determined
privately between the adults in her life, then the court must be
permitted to consider how the proposed custody arrangement directly
affects the child. Third, that the law must acknowledge the very real
parent-child relationships that can exist between children and
nonbiological parents, by giving a child's psychological parents the
right to sue for custody.
Here are the restrictions I would put on a non-biological parent's
right to sue: this parent must have had actual custody of the child for
a significant period of time; she could not sue to remove the child
from an intact biological home; and in most cases, the biological
parent would possess a presumption in her favor which must be over-
come by clear and convincing evidence. We might also consider
applying a test for custody which is narrower than the best interests
of the child: perhaps Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's "least detrimental
alternative" test.
41
41. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERTJ. SoLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 6 (1979) ("The least detrimental alternative ... is that specific placement and
procedure which maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time on the basis of short-term
predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for
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These restrictions on a non-biological parent's right to sue for
custody would defend against fears that children would be removed
from intact biological families by others who think they can do a
better job at parenting the children. And, these restrictions would
allow a biological parent to leave a child with others temporarily, with
a legal presumption that the child would be returned unless the
return would be detrimental to the child. But there should never be
a rule that biological parents can automatically repossess their
children like property, without any reference to how the change of
custody will affect the live little person involved,
If state legislatures won't take these steps, then courts should
impose them by recognizing the fundamental constitutional right of
children and their psychological parents to protect their mutual
relationships.
Finally, Robby, Jan and Jessica's case reminded me once again of
the behind-the-scenes duty of lawyers: to counsel our clients wisely
and diligently pursue compromise and settlement. There will always
be cases where a child has two or more parents fighting for the
privilege of caring for her. If we are truly dedicated to recognizing
the reality of children's lives, we must acknowledge that a winner
versus loser approach to custody cases is unrealistic and won't work.
We must push our clients, the parents, to talk with each other, to
acknowledge that the child needs all of them, and that compromise
is almost always in the child's best interests.
To conclude, I would like to make a suggestion especially fitting at
a symposium sponsored by a gender and law journal. It is my belief
that women lawyers, women law professors, women judges, women
legislators, and women activists will be essential to change the law and
practice of law to accurately reflect children's reality. Dana and Rand
Jack, in their article about women lawyers, cite a study by Piaget in
1932. They write:
[Piaget] noted marked gender differences, especially in how
children related to game rules. Boys stuck to the rules, resorting
only to 'legal elaborations,' while girls emphasized harmony and
invented new rules to suit their play ... When faced with an
argument over the rules, girls ended the game, starting over or
finding something else to do; boys argued their way through the
dispute with continual reference to 'the rules of the game.' Girls
maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become
his psychological parent.").
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sought to preserve the relationships of the players, while the boys
maintained the rules.42
If we are anything like the girls Piaget studied in 1932, and I believe
many of us, (both men and women) are, we will make many
contributions to the effort to make the legal system for children less
of a game controlled by strict and sometimes arbitrary rules and more
like a game which ebbs and flows and changes to reflect the reality of
the lives of its players.
42. DANA JACK & RAND JACK, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DONAIN 264 (Carol Gilligan,Janie VictoriaWard &Jill McLean Taylorwith Betty Bardige
eds., 1988).
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